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Of Theory and Practice
Tamar Frankel
Abstract
Much has been written about theory and practice in the law, and the tension between
practitioners and theorists. Judges do not cite theoretical articles often; they rarely
“apply” theories to particular cases. These arguments are not revisited. Instead the Essay
explores the working and interaction of theory and practice, practitioners and theorists.
The Essay starts with a story about solving a legal issue using our intellectual tools—
theory, practice, and their progenies: experience and “gut.” Next the Essay elaborates on
the nature of theory, practice, experience and “gut.” The third part of the Essay discusses
theories that are helpful to practitioners and those that are less helpful. The Essay
concludes that practitioners theorize, and theorists practice. They use these intellectual
tools differently because the goals and orientations of theorists and practitioners, and the
constraints under which they act, differ. Theory, practice, experience and “gut” help us
think, remember, decide and create. They complement each other like the two sides of
the same coin: distinct but inseparable.
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OF THEORY AND PRACTICE
TAMAR FRANKEL∗
INTRODUCTION
Much has been written about theory and practice in the law, and the tension
between practitioners and theorists.1 Judges do not cite theoretical articles often;2
they rarely “apply” theories to particular cases.3 I do not revisit these arguments.
Instead I explore the working and interaction of theory and practice, practitioners and
theorists.
Part I of this Essay tells a story about solving a legal issue using our
intellectual tools—theory, practice, and their progenies: experience and “gut.” Part II
elaborates on the nature of theory, practice, experience and “gut.” Part III of the
Essay discusses theories that are helpful to practitioners and those that are less
helpful. I conclude that practitioners theorize, and theorists practice. They use these
intellectual tools differently because the goals and orientations of theorists and
practitioners, and the constraints under which they act, differ. Theory, practice,
∗

Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. I am thankful to Dean Ronald Cass and my
colleagues, Professors Wendy Gordon and Ward Farnsworth, for their insightful comments to this
Essay.
1
See generally Honorable Stephen F. Williams, Limits to Economics as a Norm for Judicial Decisions,
21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 39 (1997) (arguing that economics is not descriptive and value neutral,
and objecting to the use of economics as a guide to the law); see also Honorable Harry T. Edwards, The
Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 35
(1992) (“(I see no reason why law professors should write mediocre economics, or philosophy, or
literary criticism, when arts and sciences professors could be doing a better job), and as long as other
law professors continue to do ‘practical’ work.”). For a description of the conflicts on the subject see
Jean R. Sternlight, Symbiotic Legal Theory and Legal Practice: Advocating a Common Sense
Jurisprudence of Law and Practical Applications, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 707 (1996).
2
See E. Allan Farnsworth, Law Is a Sometime Autonomous Discipline, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 95,
97 (1997) (stating that judges read many articles but do not cite many. Lawyers do not present law and
economics arguments in courts. Similarly, law and economics is aloof of the process and substance of
the law); see also Eric A. Posner, Standards, Rules, and Social Norms, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
101, 106 (1997) (examining a theoretical model and stating that in practice the model has little use.
When courts interpret precedents they face the question of whether they are standards or rules. The
model does not help resolve their issues. Instead courts engage in a kind of practical reasoning, then
follow precedents).
3
See DONALD A. SCHON, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: HOW PROFESSIONALS THINK IN ACTION
(1983); see also Norma Thompson, The Decline and Repudiation of the Whole: Notes on Aristotle’s
Enclosure of the Pre-Socratic World, in 37 THEORY AND PRACTICE 19, 25 (Ian Shapiro & Judith
Wagner DeCew eds., 1995) (describing the view that practice is nothing more than the application and
implementation of theories. Theories are the generalizations and practice is the items that fall within
these generalizations. In this view there is no theoretical basis for any practice except that developed
by theoreticians. This was also Aristotle’s view: “Aristotle encourages us to associate theory with the
divine and practice with the human.”).
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experience and “gut” help us think, remember, decide and create. They complement
each other like the two sides of the same coin: distinct but inseparable.
I. CREATING A BANK GIC
My story relates to the creation of a bank Guaranteed Interest Contracts or
GICs, as they are called. In the early 1980s I served part-time as a consultant to
Bankers Trust Company, New York. In the bank I was a practitioner, but many staff
members viewed me as an academic—not necessarily a compliment. I remember my
work on GICs with fondness because it helped me “earn my wings” and become one
of the group.
GICs emerged with the Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974
(“ERISA”).4 Before ERISA, employers could pay their retired employees the
promised lifelong pensions from corporate profits, year by year.5 But if employers
became insolvent, retirees, some of whom worked for forty years believing they had a
secure retirement, found themselves unsecured creditors and received near nothing.
Congress reacted to the failure of one very large employer by passing ERISA.6 The
Act requires employers to fund their future pension obligations, that is, to put aside
reserves.7 Therefore, pension plans consist of two periods. A pay-in period during
the employees’ work years, in which employers contribute to the reserve fund and the
money is invested, and a payout period, in which retiring employees receive pensions
from the reserve fund.8 Most employers use the reserve funds to buy lifelong
insurance annuities for their retired employees.9
In the late 1970s, insurance companies began to offer employers a funding
mechanism for the pay-in period.10 These are the GICs. Under the GICs, insurance
companies (1) accepted from employers the employers’ contributions to the reserve
fund; (2) paid out all pensions, and death benefits; and (3) paid to the pension plan a
fixed interest on the net amounts that the insurance companies held.11
For the insurance companies these were lucrative arrangements. Bankers
Trust’s personnel wanted to offer the same contracts to their customers-employers.
However, the general opinion was that GICs are insurance, and banks are not allowed
to offer this type of insurance.12

4

Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
5
See H.R. REP. NO. 93, at 533 (1994), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4652.
6
See Federal Reinsurance of Private Pension Plans: Hearing on S. 1575 Before the Senate Comm. On
Finance, 89th Cong. 8 (1966) (noting that after Studebaker plant closed, assets in pension fund
provided only some workers with pension rights they had earned, and many workers received nothing).
7
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
8
See Roger F. Smith, Your Pension Promise, FIN. EXECUTIVE, Nov. 1992, at 28.
9
See Milton Zall, Understanding the Risks to Pension Benefits, PERSONNEL J., Jan. 1992, at 62.
10
See Regina T. Jefferson, Rethinking the Risk of Defined Contribution Plans, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 607,
645-46 (2000).
11
1 TAMAR FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION § 9.4 (1991). These contracts were limited usually to three
years. Only the first year was “open” to payments and disbursements. The next two years were closed.
At the end of the two years the insurance companies repaid the money with interest.
12
See N.Y. State Ass’n of Life Underwriters, Inc. v. N.Y. State Banking Dep’t, 83 N.Y.2d 353, 363
(1994).
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I was presented with a problem: Is there a legal way for the bank to enter the
GICs market? A difference between a practitioner and a theorist comes to light at this
point. I did not look for the problem; it came to me; it appeared on my desk. As a
theorist I could have chosen this problem, but I was free to look for another
interesting issue. An additional difference between the roles of a theorist and a
practitioner emerges. As a practitioner I sought a way for Bankers Trust to offer and
issue GICs. Failure to find a way would have meant a disappointment, or even have
been considered a personal failure. In contrast, as a theorist, it would have made no
difference to me whether my conclusions and analysis led to one result or another.
The orientation of my “practitioner self” was to seek a concrete result and solve the
problem for the bank. The orientation of my “theorist self” was to seek the truth
regardless of the effect on the bank. To be sure, both “selves” must convince others
of the correctness of their conclusions. But at Bankers Trust, I had to convince my
general counsel, the Banking Commissioner, and perhaps the courts. As a theorist I
would have had to convince my colleagues. These audiences do not always follow
the same criteria for correctness nor do they reward in the same coin.
Returning to the story. It soon became clear that I had not one but two
problems. One problem was whether GICs were insurance contracts, reserved
exclusively to the insurance industry and prohibited to anyone else. The other
problem was whether, even if GICs were not reserved to the insurance industry, the
offering of GICs was an activity permissible to banks. This second question arose
quickly, as a result of experience. Experience comes with practice. Practice involves
repetition. For anyone working in a bank’s legal department in the 1980s, the
question of bank powers was a recurrent theme.13 Therefore, the question surfaced
immediately. A theorist without practice-based experience in this area of law might
have asked the same questions only after more, and perhaps, extensive research.
Further, experience did not merely help me pose the questions; it also served to give
me a more nuanced understanding of the issues.
My next step was to meet the bank’s staff that proposed the GIC offering. I
asked about the precise terms of the arrangement, and especially what were the
insurance companies’ obligations, time limitations, and financial rewards. Here again
experience helped; this time, experience as a theorist. In the 1970s, I wrote an S.J.D.
thesis on variable annuities.14 That subject involved distinctions between insurance
annuities and securities, and required an understanding of insurance. I remembered
that insurance laws differentiate between “insurance contracts,” such as life insurance
policies and annuities, that contain contingencies—real insurance15—and “insurance
13

See, e.g., John P.C. Duncan, The Course of Federal Pre-Emption in Federal Banking Law,18 ANN.
REV. BANKING L. 221, 313 (1999); see also Roberta S. Karmel, Regulatory Implications of Individual
Management of Pension Fund: The Challenge to Financial Regulators Posed by Social Security
Privatization, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 1043, 1068 (1998).
14
Tamar Frankel, Variable Annuities, Variable Insurance and Separate Accounts, 51 B.U. L. REV. 173
(1971).
15
See N.Y. INS. LAW § 1101(a)(1) (McKinney 2001). A life insurance policy and an annuity contain a
promise to pay upon death or throughout life. In both cases the insurance company promises payment
for an undetermined, contingent period. We do not know when the life of an insured or an annuitant
will cease. Insurance companies are able to make these promises because, even though they do not
know when an individual will die, they can ascertain, based on past statistical data, when a percentage
of a group of individuals will die. Thus, pooling a large number of insureds or annuitants, insurance
companies can offer payments to be terminated or triggered by the death of an individual. In fact,
those who buy annuities and die sooner than the average pay for those who buy annuities and die later
3

business,” such as brokerage and investment advisory services, in which insurance
companies are permitted to engage, but which are not real insurance. These other
businesses do not involve contingencies. Insurance contracts are reserved to the
insurance industry. Insurance business is not reserved to the insurance industry, and
anyone who qualified could engage in that business.
This understanding led to the question: Are GICs insurance contracts or
insurance business? The New York insurance statute did not explicitly answer the
question; neither did the courts or legal publications and treatises.16 The only
evidence that GICs constituted insurance contracts was that Insurance Commissioners
said so and that only insurance companies offered GICs. That was not enough for me.
An examination of the terms of the GICs, as described by the staff of the bank, led to
the conclusion that GICs did not contain contingencies, but rather consisted of
obligations tied to fixed interest rates and payment dates (including payments on
demand). That was enough for me, but I needed authorities to convince others.
On this issue the history of GICs helped. GICs are the offspring of group
annuities.17 During the pay-in period, before an employee retires, the reserve fund
from which the employee’s annuity will be paid is augmented by employers’
contributions and by investments. One type of such investment is the GIC. No
insurance contingencies are involved during this phase because no lifelong annuity
retirement payments are made to the particular employees.18
When insurance companies planned to offer employers such GIC investments,
they viewed GICs as annuities without contingencies.19
That raised legal
uncertainties; the companies were not sure that they had authority to issue such
“contingencies-less” annuities. Therefore, they asked the New York legislature for a
clarification, and received it.20 The introduction to the bill that authorized insurance
companies to offer GICs explained the main reason for the legislation—to allow
insurance companies to offer so-called annuity contracts without insurance
contingencies.21 That was sufficient evidence that GICs were insurance business, and
that anyone could offer them.
The second problem involved not only experience, but also the exercise of
“gut” or “intuition.” The question was whether banks could issue GICs. GICs looked
like, and were considered to be, annuities shorn of their contingencies component.
However, an examination of the way GICs actually worked revealed arrangements
under which insurance companies received money and paid it out on fixed dates or on
than the average. In life insurance the reverse is true. Those who buy life insurance and die later than
the average pay, and continue to pay premiums, for those who buy life insurance and die sooner than
the average. In addition, the premiums paid on insurance policies and annuity contracts are invested
and part of the investment return inures to the policy and annuity holders, and the insurance companies
retain part.
16
See id. § 1113 (current version at N.Y. INS. LAW § 1113 (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1999)).
17
See Messagephone, Inc. v. Texas Life, Accident, Health & Hosp. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 966 S.W.2d 133,
134 (Tex. App. 1998) (stating that a “guaranteed interest contract issued to the plan manager remains
an unallocated group annuity contract”).
18
See Ariz. Life & Disability Ins. Guar. Fund v. Honeywell, Inc., 927 P.2d 806, 808 n.1 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1996).
19
See Frankel, supra note 11, at 368.
20
See N.Y. INS. LAW § 1113(a)(2) (McKinney Supp. 1999).
21
1985 N.Y. St. Legis. Ann. 311.
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demand, under a certain formula, plus a fixed interest rate on the net amounts held.22
Stripped of insurance verbiage, which was linked historically to annuities, the
arrangement emerges under a model. A model is a species of a theory, a
generalization that may include more than one item. Under the umbrella of this
model rests not only GICs but also bank deposits. GICs do what deposits do. The
same pattern appears in different contexts—an intermediary that receives money and
pays out money with fixed interest on a specified date.
Now the accepted insurance pattern of GICs could be changed to a banking
pattern of a deposit. This exercise is similar to the visual exercise in which two
profiles facing each other can also be viewed as a vase. It depends on what pattern
one focuses to produce the image. The vision of a GIC as a bank deposit emerged in
a similar process. One unlocked the traditional view to discover whether the basic
features fit another view. They did.
While the insurance analysis was based on experience, which led to the
relevant research, the banking analysis was different. It was not experience that led to
this new view of the transaction, but a discovery of a pattern—a “gut” or intuition.
These will be described in more detail in Part II.
The next step was easy: stripping the insurance legalese and substituting for it
the banking legalese. With that done, out came a deposit that was not merely the
equivalent of a GIC, but a banking GIC. The final step was a visit to the
Commissioner of Banking to reduce the risk of a new venture into uncharted waters,
and seek support against a legal attack by the insurance authorities. The
Commissioner approved with glee: Insurance Commissioners have been protecting
their turf against banks and others so zealously! Banks expanded the use of GICs to
other purposes with great success.23 Today no one questions their authority and no
one argues that these are insurance contracts. The process of conversion involved
analysis and research based on theory, practice, experience, and a “gut” type of
pattern recognition.
II. THEORY, PRACTICE, EXPERIENCE AND “GUT” DECISIONS; HOW DO THEY HELP US
THINK, REMEMBER, DECIDE AND CREATE?
This Essay does not define theory and practice with utmost precision. But the
following definitions are generally correct and are sufficient for the purpose of this
discussion.
A. Theory, Practice, and Experience
The dictionary definition of a theory includes words like “analysis,”
“speculation,” “principle,” “belief,” “hypothesis,” and “assumption.”24 The thread
22

See Messagephone, Inc., 966 S.W.2d at 138 (citing Jonathan L. Mercier & A. Richard Susko,
Guaranteed Investment Contracts, in LEGAL ISSUES IN PENSION INVESTMENT 291 (Practicing Law
Institute 1981)).
23
See Glennie v. Abitibi-Price Corp., 912 F. Supp. 993, 996 n.1 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (“A [Bank
Investment Contract] is the same as a GIC except it is offered by a bank rather than an insurance
company.”).
24
See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1223 (10th ed. 1999).
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that connects all these words is, critical thinking and generalization—a general view
of parts of the world.25 Thus, the two components of theory are thinking in its various
aspects, and generalization—the recognition of observed or imagined patterns
covering numerous related details.
The dictionary definition of practice includes “exercise,” “custom,” “habit,”
“repeat,” and “perfect.”26 The thread that connects all these words is repetition,
whether of acting or thinking. Many of the words defining practice suggest acting on
an automatic pilot, so to speak, with no independent or critical thinking or attention.
These words may denote acting or doing with little mindfulness or attention. That,
however, is not necessarily so. An artist practices the piano with great attention and
concentration. The practice of the law and medicine in most cases is far from
routine.27 Therefore, practice is not necessarily mindlessness, but it could be.
Practice produces experience, both for practitioners and for theorists.
Experience is gained by repeated activities, including thinking. Practice is generally
not mere repetition of identical actions, especially if the actions are complex. Each
repeated action changes the actors and their product, adding to their experience, which
refines their performance and enriches their memory.
B. Practice, Experience and Theory are Closer than Seems at First Blush
Practice is not necessarily devoid of theory. In the story of GICs, the analysis
of insurance contracts required both practice and experience, as well as modeling and
generalization. In fact, practice also constitutes recognized patterns of actions.28
Practice also involves creativity. A practitioner discovered the telescope, giving rise
to later sophisticated theories.29 Thomas Edison innovated by trial and error—a
practitioner’s approach—and later his innovations were further theorized.30 Theorists
also practice. They practice writing; they practice skimming materials to get to the
core of the substance; they practice judging quickly which conversation will lead to
interesting discussions and which will not; and when they conduct experiments, they
25

Thinking should be distinguished from paying attention, although attention is important to
understanding the meaning of theory. “Attention” is ambiguous in the sense that it may denote
thinking, but not necessarily critical thinking. One meaning of attention is obedience: attention to the
orders or ideas of others. This might lead to doing what others tell us to do, paying attention to the
orders but not thinking at all. Another meaning of attention is more general and includes
“mindfulness”—focus, alertness, thoroughness, care, fascination. These words would include paying
attention not only to the directives of others but also focusing on one’s own thoughts. All these words,
however, denote a state of the mind—the use of thinking in a certain way, but not necessarily thinking
in an independent or creative way.
26
See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S, supra note 24, at 914.
27
In fact, the artist when performing, the lawyer when negotiating a complex deal or appearing in a
difficult case, and the physician when performing heart surgery, are practicing with enormous
mindfulness and attention.
28
If the actions are identical, the pattern—the theory, is not very interesting or useful. One item could
describe all items. But if the items are not identical but similar, a theory can be interesting and helpful.
Thus, “best practices” in industry are theories about recognized patterns of practices.
29
Hans Lippershey, a Dutch spectacles maker, is traditionally credited with inventing the telescope.
The Estates of Holland first used the invention for warfare. Upon learning of the invention, Galileo
built and adapted a telescope for use in astronomy. 7 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 387 (15th
ed. 1993).
30
It is not surprising that many creative lawyers crave an academic environment and career, while very
creative theorists seek to find their questions in the real world.
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practice the most efficient ways to use assistants and materials. Most importantly
practice produces generalizations and theories through the examination of patterns.
Most theories acquire recognition by tests in practice.
C. Practice, Experience and Theory are Intellectual Tools for Both Theorists and
Practitioners
Practice, experience and theory provide efficient tools for thinking,
remembering, retaining data to be brought up from our memory banks when needed,
and for effective use of attention. With these tools humans acquire new data and
innovative ideas.
We have a limited capacity for memory. Theories help us retain memory.
The items we remember are organized in categories forming a hierarchy. Thus, in
addition to knowledge and understanding, theories create such categories by grouping
under the same umbrella many items, and they help trigger the memory of each item.
Useful theories are simple because they eliminate details that are not deemed relevant
to the related patterns and help us organize data. In the case of the GICs, for example,
it was important to remember that a salient difference between insurance and other
contracts is the presence of contingencies. That memory surfaced when we resorted
to the general definition of insurance, and the sub-definitions of insurance contract
and insurance business. In addition, and just as important, theories offer ideas and
views of the world to enrich both knowledge and perception.
We have a limited capacity for attention. We are unable to focus on many
things all at once. Practice by repetition and resulting habits allows actors to do one
thing and pay attention to another. A novice driver must pay full attention to driving,
more so than a seasoned driver, who can drive while listening to music or speaking to
the other passengers. We perform many functions almost automatically, focusing on
these functions only with the appearance of danger signals. In addition, and just as
important, practice produces experience on which shortcuts to memory and ideas are
built, as described in the following section relating to “gut.”
Thus, both theories and practice help increase our database of knowledge and
creativity, but they do so in different ways. Theories bring ideas that usually come
incrementally and are subject to critical evaluations and continuous revisions. While
continuous revisions are time-consuming, theories can result in fewer serious
mistakes. It is only when a dramatic change occurs that our theories—our structured
thinking—must change. Practice is different. Because we automatize some of our
actions or thoughts, we can pay attention to other things. Practice-based experience
adds to our data banks and feeds our theorizing. However, in contrast to theorizing,
automatic actions and thoughts are not reexamined. While practice is more efficient
than theorizing, it may result in significant future mistakes, and when these are found,
habits must change. Practice and theory, however, are not entirely distinct. A wellaccepted theory acquires the force of habitual thinking and may be as hard to change
as any habit. Nonetheless, changing a theory involves the habitual tool of critical
evaluation. In that respect, changing habits is harder because it requires additional
critical awareness, which is not involved in gaining habits by practice.

7

D. Prototypes of Theorists and Practitioners
The objective, direction, constraints, and risks of theorists and practitioners
differ. Theorists seek to discover interesting, preferably hidden, problems in our
complex and puzzling universe. They strive to understand and explain these
problems, and sometimes to suggest solutions for them. Theorists offer ideas or
hypotheses and prove them true or false, right or wrong. Regardless of whether they
are correct or convincing, theorists make others (both theorists and practitioners)
think, challenge them, and expand their awareness.31
In contrast, practitioners rarely invent problems for their own sake, nor seek
hidden ones. The problems practitioners face may be obvious—a conflict among
parties; a draught; an epidemic; political unrest; a declining corporate profit margin.
Practitioners focus on achieving concrete results in the real world: winning the case,
inducing settlement among the parties; managing the water supply; finding a cure;
seeking an armed or diplomatic solution to the unrest; or rejuvenating the product and
organisation of the faltering corporation.32 Thus, the focus and objectives of theorists
and practitioners differ.
The constraints under which theorists and practitioners function also differ.
While both strive to complete their projects and both are subject to deadlines, of the
two, theorists have more time to think. Practitioners must often complete their
projects faster, and “think on their feet” with no opportunity to ponder, deliberate, and
review.33 Some practitioners, such as corporate directors, are under a double
pressure—required by law to be informed and deliberate, yet pressed by the corporate
environment to meet short deadlines.34 Therefore, practitioners must use shortcuts to
get quick answers and make quick decisions. To them, generalizations, theories, good
organization of materials and ideas, and other time-conserving mechanisms are
crucial.
Practitioners and theorists act under other constraints. However, practitioners
must achieve results under greater imposed constraints beyond their control.35 A
practising physician’s goal of curing patients is constrained by the patients’ physical
conditions and behavior, availability of funds, and sometimes, cultural limitations and
31

Practitioners use theories. In the case of GICs the practitioners at the bank had to contend with the
far more fundamental policy that divided banking from insurance. As background for justifying the
engagement of banking in GICs they needed to understand the implications not only for their business
but also for the regulators. These justifications involved the nature of the risks to the bank and the
absence of insurance risks, which, at that time, it was assumed banks were not structured to cover. The
theories concerning the nature of banking and insurance were therefore important to the bank when
approaching the Banking Commissioner for approval of the GICs. Arguably, every regulated industry
must draw on theoretical work on the history, explanation, justifications, and criticism of the regulatory
structure.
32
As mentioned before I did not seek the problem of the GIC. It came to me. But theorists who found
the question interesting produced some work on the nature of insurance and the nature of banking.
Thus, even accounting for gradations and exceptions, one could view theorists as more likely to raise
and focus on interesting unanticipated problems, and practitioners more likely to offer and focus on
interesting and unanticipated solutions to problems.
33
Arguably, law school classroom discussions and perhaps the examinations offers students the
opportunity to practice thinking on their feet or seat, short-term.
34
The duty of care that fiduciaries must exercise requires obtaining information and evaluating it, and
sometimes discussing it with colleagues.
35
Electricians and billiards players theorize differently from physics experts driven by different aims.
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beliefs. Even though judges, like other practitioners, have options and discretion,
judges must reconcile their decisions with precedents, rules of procedure, and weight
of evidence. Their decisions are subject to revisions by higher courts and the
legislatures, within limits, to the norms of their profession and the pressures of their
peers.
Lawyers operate under similar limitations, in addition to financial,
competitive, and political pressures.
In contrast, theorists enjoy more freedom than practitioners. Many a theory is
grounded in self-imposed rules, bound by limitations of the theorists’ own making—
the ground rules that they establish to determine true and false, right and wrong. The
theories of numbers and logic are of this sort.36 Such theories are not amenable to
testing in the real world. Theories exploring right and wrong human behavior, based
on moral, economic, or other principles, are subject to such “man-made” limiting
ground rules; so also are theories exploring the purpose of life, the meaning of death,
the nature of the universe, God, and our relationships to each other. These theories
are shaped and bound by human intellectual and emotional constructs: reason, faith,
and love, and subject to the theorists’ controls. Not all theorists, however, are as free.
Theories about how the world was created require real-world proof or disproof,
directly or indirectly, and are subject to real-world constraints. Similarly, experiments
in genetic engineering are limited by the availability of genes and legal limits on
experiments. These limitations are beyond the control of the theorists.
Most importantly, theorists are exposed to lesser personal risks than
practitioners. Failures are painful, but the failures of theorists are often less final.
The less “practical” theorists’ work is, the less risk it poses to themselves and to
others. Theorists may suffer from failure to convince their colleagues, but opinions of
colleagues can be wrong or may change. In contrast, practitioners may suffer from
failure to achieve their targets—to win the cases; heal the patients. These failures are
more overt, affect third parties, and are often irreversible and final. Court cases are
lost; the patients die. Thus, practitioners take greater personal risks than do theorists.
E. The Uses of “Gut”
Both practitioners and theorists use “gut” as a shortcut, timesaving tool.
Presumably, if they had the time, they could explain their thought process and the
reasons for their decisions. This mechanism is similar to the use of abbreviations,
such as USA, and both practitioners and theorists resort to it.37
More importantly, practitioners and theorists use “gut” as a shortcut, patternsearching, thinking tool in situations within complex, adaptive and changing systems.
In Hidden Order: How Adaptation Builds Complexity, Dr. John Holland offers the
building blocks of a theory of complex adaptive systems, usually populated by
adaptive agents.38 Constant adaptation to other adaptive agents and the system as a
whole is the major source of complexity and ever-changing rules under which such
36

See GOTTLOB FREGE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF ARITHMETIC (2d rev. ed., Northwestern University Press
1968) (1953).
37
This tendency contributes to the development of a language for both practitioners and theorists,
which makes it difficult for outsiders to judge the correctness of their “gut” decision, and may require
rationalization, unless outside proof such as winning in the game of chess or basketball is available.
38
JOHN H. HOLLAND, HIDDEN ORDER: HOW ADAPTATION BUILDS COMPLEXITY (1995).
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agents act. Many theories, says Dr. Holland, are linear, based on the reasoning by
“if . . . then.”39
But humans cannot calculate large, constant variations and
probabilities. Further, these theories are often based on the assumption that past
patterns will be replicated in the future. In many cases these assumptions prove
invalid. Other, more sophisticated assumptions may also prove invalid.40
In such situations actors often use “gut.” They draw on memories of
experienced actions, decisions, and situations. Intuition or “gut” tells them which
approach worked and which did not.41 In the process they search for patterns, patterns
of patterns, and relationships among them, and this search often leads to creative
decisions and approaches.42
As Dr. Holland notes, agents in a complex adaptive system, move from a rule
of “if . . . then,” to a cluster of rules that can then be automated.43 The rules are
tentative, because other rules are also possible, and the combinations of the rules
mainly depend on the questions asked. Thus, rules that emerge from aggregations of
details can become themselves details to be further aggregated.44 Adaptation to
changes alters the structure, or strategy, of the system, depending on the system’s
experience.45 Agents act by rules, and change their rules as experience accumulates.46
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See id. at 15-16.
The underlying assumptions of theories by Nobel Prize winners, which predicted variations once in a
thousand years, were proven wrong, leading to the demise of a very large hedge fund. See NICHOLAS
DUNBAR, INVENTING MONEY: THE STORY OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT AND THE LEGENDS
BEHIND IT 182-224 (2001) (describing and analyzing the rise and fall of the Long Term Capital
Management hedge fund); id. at 203 (suggesting that the sources of trouble were the assumptions
underlying some of the theories and the automatic risk management systems adopted by the banks,
which were effective for each bank but devastating for the system as a whole, under certain
circumstances).
41
See JEREMY CAMPBELL, WINSTON CHURCHILL’S AFTERNOON NAP 376 (1986). Jerry Fodor of MIT
offers a metaphor of psychological modules, which manipulate complex information in the brain. Id.
[The modules] may be capable of very elaborate and extremely rapid feats of
computation, but their range of knowledge is restricted. Modules do not know as much
as the brain as a whole knows. Other, ‘higher’ centers of the brain, such as those
involved in thinking, judging and imagining . . . share information without
hindrance. . . . [But] are denied access to the internal operations of the modules and
therefore must be content to work with the special representations of the world that
modules provide.
Id. When we are faced with very complex situations involving many items that relate to many patterns
we must break out of single patterns and create a “meta-pattern.”
42
See Alden M. Hayashi, When to Trust Your Gut, HARV. BUS. REV., Feb. 2001, at 59, 62-64.
Following a reasoning pattern that is also followed by competitors in business or in law or in any other
practice does not work. It is at this juncture that some management personnel, who are very good, stop
at middle management and do not proceed to the top level. That is why some lawyers remain at the
lower level as well. That subconscious is what distinguishes some people from others.
43
HOLLAND, supra note 38, at 45-50.
44
Id. at 10-12. Cf. Hayashi, supra note 42, at 63 (decisions on school admissions, decisions by doctors
and parole officers “confirm that professional judgment can often be reduced to . . . rules”).
45
See HOLLAND, supra note 38, at 9 (stating that a biological organism “fits itself to its
environment. . . . [E]xperience guides changes in the organism’s structure so that as time passes the
organism makes better use of its environment for its own ends.”).
46
See Hayashi, supra note 42, at 62 (stating that “gut” draws partly on the subconscious to sort
complexity and bring the results to the fore. “[E]xperience enables people to chunk information so that
they can store and retrieve it easily,” and helps discern categories of categories and patterns of patterns.
That is how people can look at the same thing—especially if it is very complex—and see different
40
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Aggregation of rules, categorization of patterns, theories, and models, are ways of
simplifying complex systems by putting similar items together and treating them as
equivalent. We discard details, which we decide are not relevant for the particular
question, and combine the details which we consider bearing on the question.
Top executives often function by “gut,” and engage in pattern searching when
complexity is great. Says AOLs Bob Pittman:
You have to figure out what the picture is. What does it all mean?
It’s not just a bunch of data. There’s a message in there. . . . Every
time I get another data point I’ve added another piece to the jigsaw
puzzle, and I’m closer to seeing the answer. And then, one day,
the overall picture suddenly comes to me.47
Pittman also says, “‘your mind continuously processes information that you are not
consciously aware of, not only when you’re asleep and dreaming but also when
you’re awake.’”48 “Aha” may be a reaction to something you read and have a feeling
you already knew.49
In shortcut thinking, experienced practice—the database produced by
practice—is important to successful outcomes. The experienced chess player dredges
from memory the images of winning and losing chessboard situations. The master
chess player will be right most of the time. A less experienced chess player, having
fewer memories on which to draw, will make wrong moves more often.
F. Testing Gut Decisions by Reasoning
Successful “gut” decisions depend on an evaluation of their result. If we can
determine the correctness of these results easily, then no more is required, and “gut”
decisions are adopted. But if we cannot easily test their success, reasoning helps
double-check the results. The converse is also true. “Gut” can help check the
correctness of reasoning.
For example, a master chess player’s “gut” decision is convincingly correct
because (1) the master is the sole master of the decision, (2) the chess game
movements are unambiguous, are fairly clearly correlated, and the feedback from the
movements is fairly quick and direct, and (3) the result—winning—is clear and
unambiguous. Similarly, a basketball player alone throws the ball, even though he
acts as a member of a team, his action is visible, and the result (ball falls within or
things each time; as they draw from the same data they see different patterns. That is how the same
legal decision can illuminate different ideas at different times).
47
Id. at 63. The top manager looks at the data a number of times, and like a scientist he tries to discern
a pattern that is helpful not only to an explanation but also as a basis for a decision to act. Pittman
knew from past experience that sometimes the sale of a product ancillary to the main focus of the
business is where the money is. Thus, in amusement parks (and movies) most revenue came from
selling refreshments and other merchandise, not from the admission tickets. He used this in another
context at AOL.
48
Id. at 61. For an illustration in the world of athletics, see Stanley Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses
of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773, 1773-74 (1987) (before a game a reporter asked Martinez what words of
wisdom his manager told Martinez before the game, and the player responded: “‘He said, “Throw
strikes and keep ‘em off the bases,’” . . . and I said: “O.K.”.’” “‘What else could I say?’” Fish
observes that what the manager and the pitcher know is “either inside of them or . . . beyond them.”).
49
Hayashi, supra note 42, at 61, see id. at 61-62 (one CEO places himself at unusual circumstances
working as a janitor).
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outside the basket) is unambiguous. In both cases actors are guided by “gut,” which
is in turn strengthened and enriched by experience. In both cases the actors cannot,
but need not, accurately articulate and rationalize their decision process.
In contrast, physicians and lawyers who act by “gut” cannot be as sure of the
correctness of their decision because they rarely act alone; credit may be due to other
than the lawyers’ or physicians’ contributions. In addition, the details in their
complex activity are not clearly correlated with one another. Further, the results of
their actions are not necessarily directly linked to their decisions. Other factors can
contribute or detract from successful results. Lawyers may lose their cases because
their clients deserve to lose; patients may die even if the physicians performed
brilliantly, guided by experienced “gut.”50
The reverse may also be true.
Notwithstanding bad “gut” decisions, clients could be acquitted and patients may
survive. Thus, the successes of lawyers and physicians do not strengthen their
experience-based “gut” to the same degree that winnings do for the chess master and
the basketball player. Even if lawyers and physicians may not be able to fully
articulate the reasons for their decisions, they may try harder to do so.
Theory and reasoning may lead to unacceptable results that must be checked
by “gut” and intuition. We reject a market theory for adoption (“market for babies”)
or a cost-benefit analysis for a rapist and its victim, or for the prevention of rape.51
Both are examples of applying simplistic linear theories to highly complex social
systems, such as placing children in adults’ care, or relationships among the sexes.52
If we add conditions to the “market for babies” to adjust for experience and “gut,” the
theory becomes so cluttered with exceptions as to lose its value as a theory—a general
statement of a part of the universe. In that case “experience” and “gut” must take the
lead.
While a habit of theorizing and reasoning does not invariably lead to a correct,
sensible, or acceptable solution, “gut” does not lead to the promise land either.53
“Gut” can create a habit of looking for patterns.54 This habit is useful, but must be
exercised in moderation. Always looking for patterns may result in not making any
decisions. The converse is also true. Automatically following what seems like a rule
before the rule’s existence is established may result in wrong decisions. The
Washington Post columnist Michael Kelly demonstrates the danger of “gut”-reliant
decisions.55 After meeting President Putin, President Bush had this to say: “‘I looked
50

Litigation lawyers rely more successfully on “gut” in cross-examination perhaps because
notwithstanding the variety of witnesses and subject matter of cross-examination, they have immediate
“feedback” for their questions and lines of inquiry and that strengthens their memory and “gut”
reactions.
51
The cost-benefit analysis described here is that among the rapist, who may benefit from the rape
more than the cost to the raped. I do not include cases in which the existence of rape is unclear and
where consent is the issue. Neither do I include cases in which the allocation of enforcement costs of
preventing rape are considered as compared to preventing other horrible crimes. These fringe issues do
not mask, however, the fallacy of applying cost-benefit analysis to those cases where these tests are
inappropriate. An attempt to cover all aspects of life by cost-benefit analysis are self-defeating because
to do so the terms themselves must be made so broad as to become meaningless.
52
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 139-43 (3d ed. 1986).
53
See CAMPBELL, supra note 41, at 376.
54
See Hayashi, supra note 42, at 63.
55
Michael Kelly, Where Sammy Sosa Meets Vladimir Putin, WASHINGTON. POST, June 27, 2001, at
A25, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A49343-2001Jun26.html.
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the man in the eye; I found him to be very straightforward and trustworthy. . . . I was
able to get a sense of his soul. . . . He’s an honest, straightforward man who loves his
country. He loves his family. We share a lot of values.’”56 In a strong reaction
Senator Helms noted: “‘[President] Putin was far from deserving the powerful
political prestige and influence that comes from an excessively personal endorsement
by the president of the United States.’”57
The worrisome thing about President Bush, said Michael Kelly is not his
mistakes in foreign policy. In fact, he is effective.
No, what is worrisome is that Bush—and in this he seems
dangerously to resemble the foreign-policy-disaster-prone John F.
Kennedy—does not seem to understand, or care about, the limits of
gut. He does not seem to want to bother with the tedious business
of study and fact-assessment that is the process by which right
decisions are most often arrived at—which is even then not so
often. He does not seem to want to work at the thing.58
This is precisely the point.
Thus, gut and reason moderate each other. The balance of their mix varies.
When the outcome of decisions cannot be easily judged, or when actors’ judgement is
inconsistent and emotions play an inappropriate part in the decisions,59 logic and
reason must be brought in as “sanity checks” to help correct mistaken decisions.60
But when logic and reason run roughshod over “gut” perceptions, producing results
that “feel very wrong,” we should stop to reexamine them.
G. Judges and Practitioners Use “Gut,” but Must Rationalize
Judges use “gut” for the same reason that other actors in a complex adaptive
system use it. Even though judges are bound by precedents, they choose the
precedents to which they analogize new situations, such as those involving the
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Id.
Id.
58
Id.
59
Emotions play a role in decisions led by “gut” reactions. Emotions are essential and important in
honing intuitive abilities to make good decisions. A gut may send its signals even by a physical
sensation. When people “know” that their decision is right their stomach may tighten, or their skin
tingles. While they may compete, “balanced emotions are critical to intuitive decision-making.”
Hayashi, supra note 42, at 62.
60
Statistical rules often out-perform human judgment because they are more consistent; for example,
they do not suffer from human moods. Not all practitioners can utilize “gut” as much as top
management, although they too must reason and justify their decisions. Judges and lawyers must
reason. Experts are good when they have rules and good categories for recognizing the indexes. This
is how intuition is related to awareness and understanding. A truly good inspired decision requires
cross-indexing; the use of analogies to unrelated fields. Many theoreticians may have the intelligence
but not the “gut.” “Gut” leads to some extent to theories. A theory, followed blind, especially when it
is based on highly complex data, is likely to be wrong, just as a “gut” has a chance of being wrong.
However, theories may help intuition by highlighting human errors, for example, our tendencies to take
risks that are too high in order to retrieve losses, that is, not knowing when to cut, or seeing patterns
where none exist, or feeling overconfident and at the same time not trusting our intuition. This mix and
mixed-up human emotions can be clarified by theories. See id. at 62.
57
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Internet, or choose among different precedents,61 or among different rationales
derived from the precedents.
However, judges must rationalize their decisions for the same reasons that
other practitioners must.62 First, judges should test their “gut” inclinations for
correctness by using reasoning.63 Many judicial decisions are not unambiguously
correct. Their short-term and long-term impact may differ; the criteria for correctness
of judicial decisions can be controversial, and their effect on society and on the
litigants cannot be always easily determined. Moreover, judges act mostly in groups.
Unless they dissent, their personal “gut” decisions are not publicized and cannot be
tested for correctness.64 Similarly, practitioners use “gut” but must rationalize. Like
top management, legal practitioners create for themselves rules, aggregate the rules
and adapt them to changes in their environment and in the behavior of other agents
with whom they interact. Second, like other lawmakers, judges must communicate to
others the reasons for their decisions, to guide behavior, establish the rule of law, and
render the lawmakers accountable.
A combined use of “gut” and reason presents a problem of communication. In
contrast to “gut” timesaving mechanism, and to rationalization, this process is hard to
articulate.65 For example, a master chess player looking at the board and
contemplating his next move may find a move that “feels” right, without being able to
explain why it does. A master ballplayer knows that he ought to throw the ball in a
certain way, but cannot describe his thought process in making this decision. Herbert
Simon says that, “when we use our gut we’re drawing on rules and patterns that we
can’t quite articulate. [We may be] aware of the result of the perception, but we’re
not aware of the steps [that led to them].”66 Intuition, he says, is the “in-between”
steps that are “mysterious only because we don’t yet understand how it works.”67
Like the master chess player, judges have “gut” feelings based on unarticulated
memory of the many cases which they have decided.
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See Stanley Fish, Almost Pragmatism: Richard Posner’s Jurisprudence, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1447,
1450-51 (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990)) (noting that
Posner’s book characterizes the judge’s controlling decision as the “choice as to what the precedent
shall be”).
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In addition law must be communicated to the public, so that people can follow the rules; judges must
be accountable, to avoid arbitrary and prejudicial decisions.
63
See Fish, supra note 61, at 1451 (suggesting that judges are bound by precedents and only
considerations of policy or ethics justify the exercise of choice among choice among precedents).
64
The correctness of the decisions of a particular court or judge may be evaluated by the size of their
following, and by their conversion from decisions on the particular facts to general rules and principles;
that is, to theories. In this respect judicial decisions are similar to theories. See KARL P. POPPER,
OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH 13 (2d rev. ed. 1979) (stating that theorists
desire to show truth and “can never justify empirically” their theories, leading to the question of which
theory is preferable); id. at 14-25 (offering methods of proof).
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See Hayashi, supra note 42, at 62 (stating that “gut” draws partly on the subconscious to sort
complexity and bring the results to the fore. “[E]xperience enables people to chunk information so that
they can store and retrieve it easily,” and helps discern categories of categories and patterns of patterns.
That is how people can look at the same thing—especially if it is very complex—and see different
things each time; as they draw of the same data they see different patterns. That is how the same legal
decision can illuminate different ideas at different times).
66
Id. at 63.
67
Id.
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Yet lawmakers, especially judges and regulators, must articulate the reasons
for their decisions in a way that would be shared with the recipients of the
information: the higher authorities and those subject to the rules. This tension
between the use of such a basis for decisions and articulating the reasons for the
decision has been, and probably will continue to be, a fertile ground for debate.68
The same issue was raised with respect to directors of corporations for similar
reasons. To render them accountable for the exercise of power vested in them,
directors should articulate the reasons for their decisions. But unlike judges, under
the “business judgment rule” directors need not rationalize their decisions, provided
they made these decisions without conflicts of interest, paid attention to the issues,
received adequate information, and deliberated.
In sum, while gut and reason complement each other they may also
paradoxically conflict with each other. They enhance our ability to innovate and
protect us from more serious mistakes that we are likely to make if we choose to
follow only one approach or only the other.69
III. USEFUL AND LESS USEFUL THEORIES FOR PRACTITIONERS
A. Practitioners Use Theories to Understand and Learn the Contexts of the Problems
with Which They Deal
Theorists can play the role of “expert witnesses,” to facilitate better decisions
in the law. Legal practitioners are “generalists;” their context is as broad and diverse
as human actions and experiences governed by law. Theories, like other information,
educate lawyers in the context with which they deal, and can point to questions, which
are crucial to the successful achievement of practitioners’ objectives. Because
practitioners include, in addition to the bench and the bar, enforcement agencies,
regulators, legislatures, and policy makers, theoretical works that are not helpful to
one group of practitioners may greatly help others. If theorists do not satisfy their
needs, practitioners do their own theorizing,70 and so do public agencies.71 Congress,
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It seems that judges’ gut reactions conflict with precedent and legal reasoning only in a few cases. In
some cases an analysis of the data convinces the judge of the weakness of his initial gut reaction. Other
cases involve highly individualized decisions, such as sentencing, in which tight and specific legal
guidelines may be “stretched” to harmonize with the judges’ sense of justice. Judges may face a
conflict with clear precedent that brings about very offensive results; for example, when a proven
brutal murderer may be released because a confession brutally forced by police taints all other evidence
of the murder. When there is no doubt as to the repugnance of the result, judges may seek justifications
on the fringe of the precedents. When the results are repugnant to the judges but not necessarily as
clearly repugnant to others, such a fringe justification may be criticized and probably continue to be
debated for some time, until settled by society.
69
The extent to which we should balance one approach or another is outside the scope of this paper.
However, the circumstances in which decisions can be verifiable by results, the extent of the decision
makers’ experience, and the extent to which the decision makers must rationalize their decisions for
other reasons, such as accountability, help determine the balance.
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In the past ten years numerous law firms have produced summaries, comments, and books prepared
by their members for wide distribution. These materials also serve as advertising for the firms’
available talents.
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The Securities and Exchange Commission often hires as its Chief Economist a person from
academia.
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for example, has a number of research arms to which it resorts as well as “think
tanks” that produce theoretical work.
B. Theories Should be Implemented in Practice Cautiously
Some theorists take their separateness from practices to the extreme. They
converse mostly with colleagues and write for colleagues. They may even assert that
they are speaking only among themselves; outsiders can listen in, but not interrupt.72
Some practitioners may reciprocate to the same degree.
While we need not go to this extreme, separating proposed actions by theorists
is not always a bad idea. While they offer ideas, theorists are not necessarily the most
suited to carry out and implement their ideas. While theories and ideas fuel thinking
and creating, not all are necessarily suitable for real-world experience in their original
form.73 To make them work, theories may require a metamorphosis and a transition.
Ideas may be the spark; but to create a fire, wood and oxygen must be available.
Theories may not materialize in practice as expected. Theories simplify and
eliminate some details that may be crucial for successful implementation. Theories
may be based on untested assumptions that, when proven wrong, may bring
catastrophic results. In the context of chaotic systems, such as the markets or the
weather, a small faraway event or the flutter of a feather can result in a crash or a
hurricane. One example of this type of crash is the demise of Long Term Capital
Management, a hedge fund that implemented extraordinary ideas of theorists, some of
whom were Nobel Prize winners.74 Experience refuted one of their assumptions.
Risk taking, however, was not the exclusive province of the theorists. One of the
theorists suggested more caution, in light of the assumption, while the business
partners decided to take the risk that led to their downfall.75 More importantly, while
all saw the feather fluttering, no one seems to have predicted the hurricane until it was
too late.
Another example of a theory that was not actively and quickly adopted relates
to the role of institutional investors, mainly mutual funds, and pension funds. These
institutional investors used to follow religiously the “Wall Street Rule,” which holds:
if you are dissatisfied with the performance of corporate management whose shares
you hold: sell.76 Institutional investors were very reluctant to actively remove the
management or interfere in the operations of the portfolio companies.
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See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law,
97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984) (addressing the distinction between laws addressed to the general public
and laws addressed to public officials).
73
See Ward Farnsworth, Talking Out of School: Notes on the Transmission of Intellectual Capital from
the Legal Academy to Public Tribunals, 81 B.U. L. REV. 13 (2001).
74
See DUNBAR, supra note 40, 182-224 (describing and analyzing the rise and fall of the Long Term
Capital Management hedge fund); id. at 203 (suggesting that the sources of trouble were the
assumptions underlying some of the theories and the automatic risk management systems adopted by
the banks, which were effective for each bank but devastating for the system as a whole, under certain
circumstances).
75
See id. at 196.
76
See Robert C. Pozen, Institutional Investors: The Reluctant Activists, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb.
1994, at 140, 147.
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Starting about ten years ago, this subject has been the centerpiece of many
scholarly works.77 Theorists urged institutional investors to change their practice and
become active in corporate governance proper.78 At first blush their proposed
approach was logical. In theory, institutional investors should be active shareholders.
Institutional investors are “professional shareholders.” They represent millions of
small investors who hold shares in the institutional investors’ portfolios. Institutional
investors are the best choice to control errant corporate management. These investors
are the private sector regulators, certainly superior to government regulators as well as
to small investors in expertise, sophistication, and desirable self-interest. Besides,
with legal voting power in addition to economic power, institutional investors should
serve the public and at the same time reduce government interference in corporate
affairs. As part of their function, they monitor the corporations whose shares they
hold, and have a significant amount of information about these corporations and about
others to compare them with. The sale of a large block of shares can depress the
market price of the shares to the detriment of investors; and “dribbling” shares into
the markets may be costly and render the stock prices uncertain. It makes sense for
institutional investors as well as for the public interest to render corporate
management more efficient by taking an active corporate governance role.
These arguments are logical. They work beautifully in theory, but they do not
pass the test of practice and experience. The investment management industry
rejected the invitation to become active investors. Even state pension funds, the most
active of the institutional investors, refrained (after some attempts) from appointing
their representatives to corporate boards of directors.79
Why was the theory unhelpful in practice? Is the investment management
industry simply wrong, following the trodden road that may have been justified years
ago, but not today? I believe that, in the view of the industry and the regulators, the
cost of changing the posture of institutional investors far exceeded the benefits.80 The
theorists noted the costs involved in these changes, such as significant conflicts of
interest and insider trading possibility. But they did not give these costs the weight
that practitioners and regulators did. They may have had a more benign view of, and
stronger belief in, market discipline against financial frauds than the practitioners did.
The theorists did not experience, for example, the problems of being embroiled in the
politics of appointing directors.
Further, the self-interest of the two groups differs. While the theorists desire
to produce innovative ideas, practitioners wish to produce profits at lower risks. The
77

See generally MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF
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risk borne by the two groups also differs. Theorists would not bear the risks of their
proposals; at most their proposals would be rejected. The practitioners would bear the
risks of implementation; failure could be very costly to them.81 Moreover, the
theorists’ goal differed. The theorist aimed at maintaining more control over
corporate management. The institutional investors and their regulators aimed at
making sure that the institutions represent investors fairly and maintain investors’
trust in them and the system. The two groups may have had different views of public
benefits and risks involved in the changing role of institutional investors. Theorists
were not as concerned about insider trading as institutional investors and regulators
were. These investors, whose main function is to trade in the markets, believed that
they would face serious problems of insider trading if their representative sat on the
corporations’ boards.82 Institutional investors are more active in the affairs of their
portfolio corporations when the costs of the Wall Street Rule become very expensive.
For example, when the portfolio companies go bankrupt. In such situations the
money managers do not stand idly by, but become active in the bankruptcy process to
protect their investors’ interests.
CONCLUSION
Practitioners and theorists view each other as different. It is natural for people
to view what they do as most important. “Purity” of approach supports self-worth. It
limits the number of people involved, encourages exclusivity (e.g., development of a
language that others cannot understand), and creates a distinctive closed club.83 The
divide seems to apply also to the audiences whom practitioners and theorists address.
Each group tends to those who share its attitudes and needs.
Theories and ideas are useful, even if they do not have immediate practical
value. They may contribute to practice and challenge our thinking, not only when
they are true and right, but also when they are false and wrong. Theories are useful in
different ways to different practitioners, such as legislators and other policy makers,
not only to the judges and the litigation bar.84 All practitioners should welcome
them.85
Practices are tremendously valuable to theorists in search for novel patterns
that have escaped others. Practices are also valuable because they preserve our
attention and help develop innovative approaches to problems. Theorists should
welcome them.
Most importantly, we all need the four intellectual tools of theory and practice,
experience and “gut.” We need them for thinking, remembering, paying attention,
and discovering new patterns. While these mechanisms have conflicting features, and
we resort to them in different ways, they complement each other. We cannot help but
incorporate them, use them, and value them all.
81

The ideas may indeed help practitioners in other contexts, but not in this case, or not at that time.
See ROE, supra note 77, at 119-20.
83
See Dan-Cohen, supra note 72, at 625.
84
Edwards, supra note 1, at 34, 44, 55. “My argument, here, assumes a particular audience for legal
scholarship—a practitioner seeking to solve a legal problem or a judge preparing to resolve a legal
dispute . . . . Id. at 55. But “the ‘practical’ scholar should seek to integrate theory with doctrine,
because both are relevant to the practitioner and government decision-maker.” Id. at 44.
85
For an insightful article on the subject see Sternlight, supra note 1, at 707.
82

18

